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In this article, the authors provide a summary of the anti-
avoidance rules in the United States that relate to bilateral 
tax treaties. Specifically, they focus on treaty-based anti-
avoidance rules and discuss whether or not a General Anti-




Anti-avoidance rules are a tool used to eliminate the abusive 
behaviour of taxpayers seeking to reduce their tax burden on 
business and investment transactions. A taxpayer should, can and 
even must structure a transaction or a business to be associated 
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with as few tax consequences as possible. However, when the only 
or the primary reason for choosing the structure is tax 
motivated it should be considered to be abusive behaviour and 
ought to be countered by the legislator. One way to counter such 
abusive behaviour is by enacting anti-avoidance rules. 
 
There are several ways to put in place anti-avoidance rules and 
there are several types of those rules. In general, anti-
avoidance rules may be divided into two main groups: (1) General 
Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs); and (2) Specific Anti-Avoidance 
Rules (SAARs). There are also several ways to enact and 
implement anti-avoidance rules, i.e. by domestic legislation, 
bilateral and multilateral agreements, court decisions, for 
example, the European Court of Justice in the European Union, or 
by the enforcement, interpretation and policy of domestic 
authorities. 
 
While SAARs are promulgated to counter a specific abusive 
behaviour, GAARs are used to support SAARs and to cover 
transactions that are not covered by SAARs. Accordingly, abusive 
behaviour on the part of a taxpayer that might defeat a SAAR 
either due to technicalities or sophisticated planning might 
eventually be targeted and disallowed or recharacterized by a 
GAAR. However, an essential prerequisite of characterizing 
2




taxpayer actions is a description of the specific actions to be 
so categorized.1 Consequently, one question, which may be asked, 
is whether SAARs are necessary and whether a GAAR might be 
sufficient to counter abusive transactions. 
 
In this article, the authors provide a broad summary of the 
anti-avoidance rules used in the United States that relate to 
its bilateral tax treaties. The primary anti-avoidance rules 
used by the United States in its domestic legislation are the 
thin capitalization rules (earnings stripping), expatriation 
tax, transfer pricing, substance-over-form, step transaction, 
economic substance, limitation on hybrid entities, anti-conduit 
regulations, and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
rules.2 The anti-avoidance rules included in most of US tax 
treaties are beneficial ownership, limitation on benefits (LOB) 
and limitation on residents. In this article, the authors also 
focus on treaty-based anti-avoidance rules. They then discuss 
whether or not a GAAR would be appropriate in the context of US 
tax treaties. 
 
2. Limitation on Hybrid Entities3 
																																																								
1. J.D. Rosenberg Tax Avoidance And Income Measurement, 87 Mich. L. Rev. p. 365 (Nov. 1988). 
2. At the time of the writing of this article, the FATCA rules were not yet in force. 
3. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation Report [JCS-23-97], at p. 251, it was estimated that the 
provision would increase federal fiscal year budget receipts by USD 1 million per year in each of the years 1998 to 
3
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In 1997, the US Treasury promulgated regulations under the 
section 7701 classification rules of the US Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC),4 known as the “check-the-box” regulations. Pursuant 
to the regulations, entities, whether domestic or foreign, can 
be considered for tax purposes to be partnerships and, 
therefore, their income is subject to tax at the hands of their 
members or beneficiaries. However, this rule applies only to 
entities that are not considered to be “per se corporations”. 
Per se corporations are considered to be corporations for tax 
purposes and, therefore, taxed as separate entities, 
notwithstanding the check-the-box regulations.5 Consequently, any 
other entity that is not considered to be per se and wishes to 
be taxed as corporation should make an election either by the 
entity or its members to be allowed such a tax treatment. The 
election is available to any entity, in addition to per se 
corporations, even if taxed differently in the home country, 
i.e. taxed as a partnership in the United States and as a 
separate entity in the other jurisdiction and vice versa. As a 
result of the potential of different tax treatment in two 
jurisdictions, avoiding taxes in multiple tax jurisdictions 
became easily accessible. The US Congress, therefore, became 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
2007. It is beyond the scoop of this article to argue whether this estimate was correct and especially, if correct, 
whether it was justify to introduce section 894 and its regulations. 
4. IRC Regs. 301.7701-2 to 301.7701-3. 
5. The list of per se corporations is contained in IRC Regs. 301.7701-2(b). 
4




concerned as to the potential tax-avoidance opportunities 
available for foreign investors in the United States through 
dual tax classification entities (hybrid entities):6 
 [PCD single spaced] 
In particular, the Congress understood that the interaction 
of the tax laws and the applicable tax treaty could provide 
a business structuring opportunity that would allow 
Canadian corporations with U.S. subsidiaries to avoid both 
U.S. and Canadian income taxes with respect to those U.S. 
operations. 
 
Pursuant to these concerns,7 in 1997, the Congress enacted 
section 894(c) to deny the limited withholding tax rates, 
provided by tax treaties with regard to any item of income that 
is subject to tax in the United States. The denial of the 
benefits is imposed when the income is derived through an entity 
that, under US tax law, is treated as a hybrid entity, provided 
that the income is not considered: (1) to be derived and taxed 
by the foreign person under the tax laws of the treaty state; 
(2) the tax treaty does not contain a provision on its 
application in respect of an item of income derived through a 
																																																								
6. Joint Committee on Taxation Report [JCS-23-97], at p. 249. See also HR Rep. No. 148, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 550 (1997. For the structure described by the Committee, see [Initials] Klein & [Initials] Renfroe, Section 
894: Payments to Flow-Through Entities, 26 Tax Mgt. Intl. J. P. 547 (1997). 
7. HR Rep. No. 148, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1997). 
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partnership;8 and (3) the treaty state does not impose tax on a 
distribution of such income from such an entity to such a 
person.9 
 
In 2002, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the US 
Treasury finalized and introduced Reg. 1.894-1(d), which is a 
special rule for items of income received by entities in attempt 
to provide additional taxpayer certainty in complex settings 
regarding the consequences of partnership or corporate status 
and the availability of treaty benefits. The regulations apply 
in respect of all income tax treaties to which the United States 
is a party with the exception of when the United States and the 
other treaty partner “otherwise explicitly agreed upon” either 
in the treaty text or by a mutual agreement procedure (MAP) 
taken by the competent authorities of the two countries.10 An 
entity is eligible to the reduced withholding tax rate in a 
relevant tax treaty only to the extent that the income is 
derived by a resident11 of the treaty partner jurisdiction, and 
taxed accordingly.12 
																																																								
8. See US Model Income Tax Convention art. 1(6) (15 Nov. 2006), Models IBFD regarding transparent 
entities. 
9. See HR Rep. No. 148, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1997) (a foreign country is “considered to impose tax on 
a distribution even though such tax may be reduced or eliminated by … deductions or credits otherwise available to 
the taxpayer”). See also B.B. Bittker & L. L. Lokken: Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts para. 67.3. 
Treaty Limitations and Antiabuse Rules (WG&L 20092009). 
10. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(4). 
11. Under Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(3)(v) a person is a determined as resident of a treaty jurisdiction according to 
the rules of the tax treaty. 
12. Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(1). 
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3. Beneficial Ownership 
 
The beneficial owner requirement is a SAAR found in most US tax 
treaties and also in the OECD Model (2010)13 and the UN Model 
(2001).14 In general, the beneficial ownership requirement is 
situated in articles 10, 11 and 12 of tax treaties, dealing with 
dividends, interest and income from royalties, respectively.15 
Some countries also add the beneficial ownership requirement to 
article 13 dealing with capital gains.16 
 
Article 10(1) provides that income from dividends may be taxed 
in the state where the recipient is a resident. Articles 11(1) 
and 12(1) provide that an income from interest and royalties may 
be taxed only in the state where the recipient is a resident. 
However, article 10(2) allows the state of source to impose 
withholding tax on such income in accordance to the source 
state’s domestic laws. In addition, the article limits the 
source state to imposing withholding tax at a rate that is 
usually lower or equal to that provided for by domestic law (0% 
to 15%). The residence state’s sole taxing right and the reduced 
																																																								
13. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (22 July 2010), Models IBFD. 
14. UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2001), Models IBFD. 
15. Reference to articles in this section are to the articles of the US Model (2006). 
16. See, for example, Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the 
Republic of Singapore for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income art. 13(5) (19 May 2005), Treaties IBFD. 
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tax rate granted to the source state only applies when the 
beneficial owner of the income is a resident of the other 
contracting state.17 Otherwise, the source state may impose tax 
in accordance to its domestic law. In the United States, 
according to sections 1441-1443 of the IRC, income from 
dividends, interest and royalties (FDAP) sourced in the United 
States is subject to a 30% withholding tax. 
 
The reduced (or no) tax rate imposed by the source state applies 
only when the beneficial owner is a resident of the other 
contracting state. Accordingly, in situations where the 
recipient is not the beneficial owner, the treaty rate is 
allowed if it can be demonstrated that the beneficial owner is a 
resident of the treaty state, even if not the recipient. For 
instance, if a US-based company pays dividend to a resident of 
the United Kingdom, to withhold taxes under the United Kingdom-
United States Income Tax Treaty (2001),18 the beneficial owner 
must be UK resident. 
																																																								
17. It should be noted that, in OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1995), the OECD 
amended OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (11 Apr. 1977), Models IBFD by replacing the 
words “if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the dividends” with “if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a 
resident of the other Contracting State”. However, in the US Model Income Tax Convention (20 Sept. 1996), Models 
IBFD and US Model (2006) the wording is “… if the dividends are beneficially owned by a resident of the other 
Contracting State”. Accordingly, the demand that the income is received by the beneficial owner, as was the case in 
the OECD Model before 1995, was not included in the US Model and was subsequently also omitted from the 
OECD Model. 
18. Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains (24 July 2001), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: U.K.-
U.S. Income Tax Treaty]. 
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The term “beneficial owner” is defined neither in tax treaties 
nor in the various models. This fact, together with the 
different interpretations given to the term by different 
countries and courts, increases uncertainty and costly 
litigation between tax authorities and taxpayers.19 In addition, 
even more complications are associated with the fact that the 
concept of beneficial ownership or beneficial owner is not 
recognized in the civil law countries that are members of the 
OECD,20 which raise the possibility that disagreement might arise 
between countries that might be unappeasable, even through a 
MAP. In one decision,21 a court in Canada held that a holding 
company is considered to be the beneficial owner with regard to 
Canada–Netherlands Income Tax Treaty (1986).22 That decision was 
given by the court, despite the fact that the holding company 
had minor activities and assets, and received and distributed 
dividends almost simultaneously. The court had a long debate as 
to how to define the term “beneficial” owner when the source 
state was a civil law country and the recipient state was in a 
common law country. 
																																																								
19. For a broader explanation and concern as to multilateral disagreement, see P. Baker, Beneficial Ownership: 
After Indofood, 6 GITC Rev. 1 (Feb. 2007). 
20. CA: TC, 22 Apr. 2008, Prévost Car Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2004-2006(IT)G and 2004-4226(IT)G, 
Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. 
21. Id. 
22. Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Canada for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 








4. Limitation on Benefits 
 
States regard a tax treaty as a vehicle to provide treaty 
benefits to residents of the contracting states, the parties to 
the agreement, as achieved by their treaty delegation. The 
question that is, therefore, raised in respect of this approach 
is who is entitled to be treated as a resident of a contracting 
state and so to enjoy treaty benefits. 
 
Although the text of the OECD Model does not have express anti-
abuse provisions, the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model 
(2010)23 contains an extensive discussion approving the use of 
such provisions in tax treaties to limit the ability of third 
country residents to obtain treaty benefits. 
 
The United States’ position is that tax treaties should include 
specific, broad and detailed provisions to prevent misuse of tax 
treaties by residents of third countries. Consequently, the US 
Model (1981),24 as amended in 1996 and again in 2006, includes 
LOB provisions and, therefore, most US tax treaties contain 
comprehensive LOB provisions that include some changes comparing 
																																																								
23. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 1 (22 July 2010), Models 
IBFD. 
24. US Model Income Tax Convention (16 June 1996), Models IBFD. 
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to the US Model (2006).25 In general, a tax treaty that provides 
benefits to a resident of a contracting state permits the use of 
the tax treaty by residents of third countries to obtain the 
benefits of a tax treaty between the two contracting states by 
way of a legal entity formed in one of the two contracting 
state, i.e. treaty shopping. 
 
It should be noted that not every case of a third country 
resident establishing legal entity in other state is considered 
to be treaty shopping. If there are substantial reasons for 
establishing the structure that were unrelated to obtaining 
treaty benefits, the structure does not fall within the 
definition of “treaty shopping”. 
 
Article 22 and the anti-abuse provisions of domestic law 
complement each other, as article 22 effectively determines 
whether an entity has a sufficient nexus to the contracting 
state to be treated as a resident for treaty purposes, while the 
domestic anti-abuse provisions, for example, the business 
purpose, substance-over-form, step transaction or conduit 
principles, determine whether a particular transaction should be 
recast in accordance with its substance. Accordingly, the 
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internal law principles of the source state may be applied to 
identify the beneficial owner of an item of income and article 
22 is then applied to the beneficial owner to determine if that 
person is entitled to the benefits of the tax treaty with regard 
to the income.26 
 
The LOB article of the US Model (2006) reflects significant 
changes to the LOB article of the US Model (1996). These changes 
are intended to make it more difficult for third country 
residents to benefit inappropriately from a tax treaty. When a 
resident of one state derives income from another, the domestic 
tax laws of the two countries may cause that income to be taxed 
in both countries, either because of source: resident taxation 
or because of source:source taxation. Consequently, one purpose 
of a tax treaty is to prevent the double taxation of residents 
of the treaty states by allocating taxing rights in respect of 
cross-border transactions. As noted previously, although a tax 
treaty is intended to apply only to residents of the two treaty 
states, residents of a third country may attempt to benefit from 
a tax treaty by engaging in tax favourable structuring. 
 
From the early 1980s, the United States, when signing tax 
treaties, has insisted on including an LOB denying treaty 
																																																								
26. US Model Income Tax Convention Technical Explanation (15 Nov. 2006), Models IBFD. 
12




benefits if a person to whom treaty benefits should be granted 
is not the taxpayer resident in one of the states. 
 
The US Model (1980) contained an LOB provision, in article 16, 
that denied treaty benefits to an entity that was resident in 
one of the contracting states unless more than 75% of the 
beneficial interest in the entity were owned by individuals 
resident of the same state and no substantial part of its income 
was paid out from the entity as interest, royalties or other 
deductible payments to residents of a third country. That double 
test encompassed the ownership and the base erosion tests to the 
effect that an entity established in a foreign state was owned 
by residents of that state so as to eliminate the use of such an 
entity. This was because, in paying all its income to a third 
country, the base erosion test requires that a substantial part 
of its profits remain in that country. Article 16 also denied 
treaty benefits if the income was subject, in the residence 
state, to lower tax than that which would apply to similar 
income arising in that state that was derived by resident of the 
other state. 
 
These strict rules were an obstacle to bona-fide structures 
forming a real business due to the ownership test, as they 
demanded a high ownership threshold. Beginning with the protocol 
13
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to the Italy-United States Income Tax Treaty (1984),27 a 50% 
ownership threshold was introduced as opposed to the previous 
75% threshold in respect of the ownership and base erosion 
tests.28 The new threshold was included in tax treaties 
negotiated and signed in the 1990s.29 
 
The US Model (1996) substantially refined the LOB article and 
tax treaties signed few years latter reflected the provisions 
contained in that Model. The US Model (2006) changed the LOB 
article yet again. This has found expression in the recent tax 
treaty negotiated and signed by the United States. 
 
The LOB articles included in recent tax treaties and protocols 
are generally similar to each other as well as to the US Model 
(2006). Nonetheless, there are some differences. Specifically, 
the public trading test, the derivative benefits rules30 and the 
foreclosure eligibility in respect of treaties benefit certain 
triangular arrangements.31 The US Model (2006) does not, however, 
																																																								
27. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Italian 
Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and the Prevention of Fraud or 
Fiscal Evasion (17 Apr. 1984), Treaties IBFD. 
28. For instance, Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Indonesia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect 
to Taxes on Income art. 28(6)-(8) (1 July 1988), Treaties IBFD. 
29. Bittker & Lokken, supra n. 9. 
30. This is intended to grant treaty benefits to a treaty state resident if the resident’s owners would have been 
entitled to the same benefits had the income flowed directly to them. 
31. An arrangement whereby income, such as interest, is lightly taxed because it is derived by a third country 
PE of a treaty state resident. 
14




include special derivative benefits rules or rules for 
triangular arrangements. 
 
Article 22 of the US Model (2006) contains a list of persons who 
are entitled to the benefits of the tax treaty and refers to 
them as “qualified persons”. Persons who do not fall within the 
definition of a qualified person may, nevertheless, be entitled 
to the benefits of a tax treaty under certain conditions as is 
explained below. 
 
Article 22(1) of the US Model (2006) grants treaty benefits to 
individual resident of a treaty state. However, if the 
individual is used as a device to obtain treaty benefits for a 
resident of a third country and is, therefore, not considered to 
be the beneficial owner in respect of the income, the benefits 
are denied.32 Under article 22(1) and (3), an entity resident in 
a treaty state is entitled to treaty benefits only if it falls 
within one of the following categories. 
 
The article treats some persons as qualified persons and, 
therefore, as entitled to treaty benefits with no restrictions, 
but other persons are only treated as such subject to 
limitations. The US Model (2006) allows treaty benefits to 
																																																								
32. US Model (2006), Technical Explanation regarding the term “beneficial ownership”. 
15
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governments, political subdivisions and local authorities of a 
contracting state. This provision is narrower than the 
corresponding provision of the US Model (1996), which allowed 
treaty benefits to any qualified governmental entity, including 
entities owned by the treaty state, governmental pension funds 
and the governing body of the contracting state.33 
 
5. Recent Developments34 
 
5.1. Introductory remarks 
 
The tax treaties and protocols signed by the United States in 
recent years have changed compared to the US Model (2006) 
following the introduction of a new article that reflects the 
anti-treaty-shopping provisions. 
 
The traditional LOB provision in the US Model (2006) applies 
only if the principal class of a company’s shares is primarily 
traded on a recognized stock exchange located in the company’s 
residence state. However, for example, the public trading tests 
																																																								
33. See art. 22(2)(b) US Model (1996). 
34. Joint Committee on Taxation, Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Proposed Tax Protocols with Sweden and France and the 
Proposed Tax Treaty with Bangladesh (JCX- 08-06) (2 Feb. 2006). 
16




in the Belgium-United States Income (2006),35 Denmark-United 
States Income (1999)36 and Finland-United States Income and 
Capital (1898)37 Tax Treaties may be satisfied by trading on a 
stock exchange located in a company’s residence state in other 
jurisdictions that are considered to be part of the economic 
area that includes the relevant treaty state. Such tax treaties 
include the derivative benefits rules that are intended to grant 
treaty benefits to a treaty state resident if the resident’s 
owners would have been entitled to the same benefits had the 
income flowed directly to them. 
 
5.2. Triangular arrangements 
 
Despite the absence of a triangular arrangements provision in 
the US Model (2006), the Belgium-United States Income (2006), 
Denmark-United States Income (1999) and Finland-United States 
Income and Capital (1898) Tax Treaties include rules that are 
intended to prevent eligibility for treaty benefits arising in 
respect of certain triangular arrangements. Such arrangements 
include where interest on a loan is lightly taxed, as it is 
																																																								
35. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom 
of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income (27 Nov. 2006), Treaties IBFD. 
36. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom 
of Denmark for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income (19 Aug. 1999) (as amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD. 
37. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic 
of Finland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital (21 Sept. 1989) (as amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD. 
17
Avi-Yonah and Halabi:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2012
18 
	
derived by a third-country permanent establishment (PE) of a 
treaty state resident. 
 
This provision is likely to appear on tax treaties with 
countries that use the exemption method to eliminate double 
taxation, rather than the credit method. Some countries, for 
example, Belgium, Denmark and Germany, have moved towards a 
territorial tax system, which, in general, taxes income 
generated within the country. In such countries, the income of a 
resident company derived through a PE located in a treaty state 
is exempt from tax in the residence state. 
 
The Belgium-United States Income Tax Treaty (2006) includes 
rules that are intended to allow treaty benefits for certain 
treaty state residents functioning as headquarters companies. 
Although the US Model (2006) does not include special 
limitation-on-benefits rules for headquarters companies, similar 
rules have been included in the Australia-United States (1982)38 
and the Netherlands-United States (1992)39 Income Tax Treaties. 
The 2006 protocol to the Denmark-United States Income Tax Treaty 
(1999) includes rules that are intended to allow treaty benefits 
																																																								
38. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (6 Aug. 
1982), Treaties IBFD 
39. Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (18 Dec. 1992), Treaties 
IBFD. 
18




to certain Danish taxable non-stock corporations and Danish 
companies owned by taxable non-stock corporations. Taxable non-
stock corporations are entities designed to preserve control of 
certain Danish operating companies through control of the 
companies’ voting stock. The 2006 protocol to the Germany-United 
States Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1989)40 includes special 
rules for determining whether or not certain German investment 
vehicles are entitled to treaty benefits. Under article 1(1) of 
the US Model (2006), as well as article 1 of the OECD Model 
(2010), a foreign person is entitled to treaty benefits in 
respect of the relevant tax treaty only if the person is a 
resident of the foreign state with which the United States has 
concluded the tax treaty. 
 
The 2005 protocol to the Sweden-United States Income Tax Treaty 
(1994)41 applies to triangular branch structures in respect of 
certain types of US income earned. Under the rule, some payments 
of interest, royalties and insurance premiums paid by a US payor 
to a PE of a Swedish resident in a third country may be subject 
to US withholding tax if Sweden does not tax the income and the 
third country only taxes it lightly. However, the 2005 protocol 
																																																								
40. Convention Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to 
Certain Other Taxes (29 Aug. 1989) (as amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD. 
41. Convention Between the Government of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (1. Sept. 
1994) (as amended through 2005), Treaties IBFD. 
19
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limits the US withholding tax to 15% in respect of interest and 
royalties, rather than applying the 30% withholding under US 
domestic law. 
 
5.3. Recognized stock exchanges 
 
Most LOB articles provide that a company that is a resident of a 
treaty state qualifies for treaty benefits, without regard to 
whether or not any other tests are satisfied, if there is 
substantial and regular trading of its principal class of stock 
on an approved stock exchange located in one of the two treaty 
states. Recognized stock exchanges typically include the NASDAQ 
and/or any US exchange established under the Securities Exchange 
Act (1934), one or more exchanges in the other contracting 
state, and other exchanges as may be agreed by the competent 
authorities. 
 
Under the France-United States Income and Capital Tax Treaty 
(1994),42 recognized stock exchanges include the following: (1) 
the NASDAQ and any stock exchange registered with the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a national 
securities exchange for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act 
																																																								
42. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French 
Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income and Capital (31 Aug. 1994), Treaties IBFD. 
20




(1934); (2) the French stock exchanges controlled by the 
Commission des operations de bourse; and (3) the exchanges of 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Hamburg, London, Madrid, Milan, 
Sydney, Tokyo and Toronto, and any other stock exchanges as may 
be agree by the competent authorities. 
 
Under the Netherlands-United States Income Tax Treaty (1992), 
recognized stock exchanges include any stock exchange registered 
with the SEC, the NASDAQ, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange or the 
parallel market of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, except with 
regard to closely held companies, and any other exchange as may 
be agreed by the competent authorities. The competent 
authorities have expanded this list to include the exchanges in 
Brussels, Frankfurt, Hamburg, London, Madrid, Milan, Paris, 
Sydney, Tokyo and Toronto. The Hungary-United States (2010),43 
Iceland-United States (2007)44 and United Kingdom-United States 
(2001) Income Tax Treaties have expanded the stock exchanges 
covered by the definition of recognized stock exchanges to 
include not only the stock exchanges in the treaty partner’s 
country, but also a list of other stock exchanges, usually from 
an EU Member States, but also from other countries with 
																																																								
43. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic 
of Hungary for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income(4 Feb. 2010), Treaties IBFD. 
44. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iceland for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (23 Oct. 
2007), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: Ice.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty]. 
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attractive and active stock markets, such as Johannesburg,45 
Sydney, Tokyo and Toronto.46 
 
The publicly traded company test in the 2005 protocol to the 
Sweden-United States Income Tax Treaty (1994) includes general 
requirements, referred to as the “substantial presence” test, 
and defines a recognized stock exchange in respect of a company 
resident in the United States as a recognized stock exchange 
located in a third country that is a party to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or, in respect of a company 
resident in Sweden, as a recognized stock exchange located in 
the European Economic Area (EEA), the European Union or 
Switzerland. 
 
5.4. Derivative benefits 
 
Prior to the Netherlands-United States Income Tax Treaty (1992), 
the Jamaica-United States Income Tax Treaty (1980)47 was the only 
occasion on which the United States had agreed to a “derivative 
																																																								
45. U.K.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty. 
46. Ice.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty and U.K.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty. 
47. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Jamaica for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (21 May 
1980), Treaties IBFD. 
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benefits”48 provision. In addition, only this tax treaty and the 
1995 protocol to the Canada-United States Income Tax Treaty 
(1980)49 apply the derivative benefits concept fully, without 
restriction to a particular group of countries.50 
 
The absence of the derivative benefit resulted in a situation 
that a resident of a third state, which has a tax treaty with 
the United States that is in accordance to the US Model (2006), 
is not entitled to treaty benefits if investing or deriving 
income in the United States via an entity resident in another 
country that has a similar tax treaty with the United States, 
assuming that both states signed the same tax treaty with the 
United States that is consistent with the US Model. Such a 
disadvantage has no rationale. The reason for limiting the use 
of a tax treaty by way of an LOB provision is in respect of a 
resident of a non-treaty state investing in the United States 
through a treaty state. This is a rationale that can be 
accepted. Accordingly, the derivative benefits test was 
introduced to mitigate this abnormality in the LOB provision in 
the US Model. This change in the US perspective in relation to 
																																																								
48. A corporation resident in Jamaica and owned by a US corporation is entitled to treaty benefits, provided 
that it is held by an individual resident in third country and that individual would have been entitled to the benefits in 
an applicable tax treaty between the third country and the United States. 
49. Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital (26 Sept. 1980) (as amended through 1995), Treaties IBFD. 
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the LOB provision is a matter of policy, as it has already been 
decided that the residents of third countries should qualify for 
this benefit and that, prima facie, the residents of the third 
countries are not treaty shopping by way of another [correct?] 
contracting state, as the same benefits are available in the 
home state. 
 
The derivative benefit provisions in recent tax treaties, for 
example, in the United Kingdom-United States Income Tax Treaty 
(2001), provide that, if a resident company of one state that 
receives income from the United States is substantially owned by 
residents of a third country and that third country has a tax 
treaty with the United States that provides for the same 
benefits in respect of that income as in the tax treaty, there 
should be no objection to such third country residents obtaining 
that benefit indirectly via the tax treaty, as opposed to 
directly under the third country treaty with the United States. 
 
5.5. Equivalent beneficiaries 
 
An “equivalent beneficiary” is another extension of the US LOB 
article and can usually be found in the recent tax treaties 
signed by the United States with EU Member States. The 
definition of the term includes not only a resident of one of 
24




the contracting states, but also a resident of an EU or EEA 
Member State, but where there is a tax treaty between the EU or 
EEA Member State and the United States and would, under the tax 
treaty, be considered to be a “qualified person”. 
 
The need for an extension from a beneficiary to an equivalent 
beneficiary is in line with the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (2007),51 which prohibits discrimination in 
respect of establishment. In this regard, it should be noted 
that the rationale behind the concept of the freedom of 
establishment is, in general, to treat all the EU Member States 
as one. 
 
5.6. Limitation on residents 
 
Under most US tax treaties, and as provided for by the OECD and 
UN Models, the provisions of a tax treaty are limited to 
residents of one of the contracting states. One of the reasons 
for this explicit requirement is to avoid that misuse of a 
bilateral tax treaty by a person who is a not a resident of 
either of the contracting states. In this respect, article 4 of 
the OECD, UN and US Models provides that a resident of a 
																																																								
51. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007) OJ C 115 (2008), EU Law IBFD. 
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contracting state is a person who under the laws of the home 
country is considered to be a resident. 
 
Although the definition of a resident as provided by article 
4(1) refers to the concept of residence as adopted in the 
domestic laws, the article indicates that the criteria to be 
considered in defining the term resident are those to the extent 
to which the term is based on the person’s domicile, residence, 
place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature. 
 
The fact that a person is determined to be a resident of a 
contracting state under the laws of that state does not 
necessarily entitle that person to the benefits of a tax treaty. 
In addition to being a resident under the domestic law, the term 
resident must also be in line with the criteria contained in 
article 4 of the tax treaty to be treated as resident for the 
application of the tax treaty and, therefore, to receive the 
benefits granted to the residents of a contracting state. 
 
Accordingly, although the definition of a resident to whom a tax 
treaty might apply is borrowed from and relies on the domestic 
legislation of each of the contracting states, the various 
models ensure that the residence of a taxpayer is material and 
not technical, by providing for an exception to the rule in 
26




stating that the term “resident” does not include any person who 
is liable to tax in that contracting state only in respect of 
income from sources in that state or capital situated therein.52 
Excluding persons who are subject to tax only on a territorial 
basis is intended to ensure that treaty benefits are only 
granted where the income derived abroad is taxed in the person’s 
residence state.53 
 
Tax treaties are not usually concerned with the domestic laws of 
the contracting states, or how the laws are structure or 
defined.54 This is, however, not true with regard to the 
definition of a resident. A tax treaty sets out the conditions 
under which a person is to be treated as fiscally resident and 
also includes a condition that that person is fully liable to 
tax in that state. 
 
A tax treaty excludes from the definition of a resident a person 
who is not “liable to tax” in a contracting state under its 
laws. Consequently, tax treaties include an anti-avoidance rule 
to eliminate the potential double non-taxation when a person is 
																																																								
52. Art 4(1). 
53. For a thorough explanation of the exclusion under art. 4(1), see OECD Model: Commentary on Article 4 
(2010). 
54. See art. 3(2) of the OECD, UN and US Models, which provides, without exception, that “any term not 
defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of 
that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws 
of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State”. 
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not liable to tax in the residence state and the source state 
does not tax the relevant income due to the application of a tax 
treaty, for example, article 11, which provides for a sole 
taxing right in respect of the residence state. 
 
As the “liable to tax” condition has, in recent years, raised 
many questions regarding entities that are tax exempt in their 
residence state as to whether or not they are considered to be 
“liable to tax”, countries have expressed their concerns and the 
OECD has responded. In this respect, the OECD has stated in 
paragraphs 8.6 to the Commentary on Article 4 (2010), that tax 
exempted entities, for example, pension funds: 
 [PCD single spaced] 
may be exempted from tax, but they are exempt only if they 
meet all of the requirements for exemption specified in the 
tax laws. They are, thus, subject to the tax laws of a 
Contracting State.55 Furthermore, if they do not meet the 
standards specified, they are also required to pay tax. 
 
6. Conclusions: A GAAR for US Tax Treaties? 
 
																																																								
55. See also the thorough discussion on the implications of “liability to tax” in OECD, The Granting of Treaty 
Benefits with respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles (2010) [correct?], International 
Organizations’ Documentation IBFD, inserted into paras. 6.9-6.34 of the OECD Model: Commentary of Article 1 
(2010), especially paras. 6.11-6.16. 
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As this article indicates, US tax treaties are subject to 
numerous SAARs. However, the question still remains as to 
whether or not a GAAR would be appropriate in this context. 
 
The problem with US SAARs is that they tend to be very 
complicated and technical. A comparison of the LOB article in US 
tax treaties with that in the US Model (2006) suggests that 
actual LOBs have loopholes, introduced during the treaty 
negotiations, that can be exploited. Other SAARs, such as the 
anti-hybrid rule, are very narrow in scope. 
 
The advantage of a GAAR is that is it by definition much broader 
and less subject to avoidance. The disadvantage is that a GAAR 
may deter legitimate transactions. However, the evidence from 
other countries that have GAARs suggests that with appropriate 
safeguards a GAAR is not a significant disincentive in respect 
of legitimate transactions, but, rather, that it restricts 
abusive tax planning. India and the United Kingdom are two 
countries that are currently contemplating adopting a GAAR for 
this reason. 
 
The United States is unlikely to enact a GAAR any time soon. The 
enactment of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 may have an 
important effect on tax treaties. Before then, it was unclear as 
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to whether or not the IRS had the authority to promulgate SAARs 
in a treaty context, such as conduit regulations, that could 
override tax treaties. Now, however, the IRS can argue that the 
conduit regulations are an application of economic substance, as 
conduits are likely to lack a bone fide business purpose. It 
may, therefore, be that, in the treaty context, the conduit 
regulations will now act essentially as a GAAR and apply to 
situations that are not caught by the SAARs described previously 
in this article. 
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